If trust is the most important thing in the Army, what comes next?

Success in battle?  This would have to take the prize; but fortunately, appearances on the battlefield are few and far between.  What is it then that follows trust, as the Army’s next most important criteria (both in peace and at war)?

It doesn’t take a military genius to nominate morale – regarded as so important that it’s included as a component of combat power.  If a unit has high morale, its combat power is increased.

What exactly is morale?  One definition is: ‘The spirit that a group has that makes it want to succeed’.  Wikipedia defines it as:“The capacity of a group of people to pull together persistently and consistently in pursuit of a common purpose”.  Confidence, enthusiasm, discipline, willingness to endure hardship, cheerfulness, sense of purpose and usefulness – all contribute to morale. 

The secrecy with which 1st Armoured Regiment’s tanks were stripped from it undoubtedly resulted in a loss of trust in the Chief of Army.  Did it also have an effect on morale?

Interestingly, on 31 Jan 25 the Chief of the Defence Force advised, following 1 Armd Regt being made an experimentation unit, that “morale in the Regiment is high; the Army is monitoring this carefully and by all markers unit morale improved in 2024 from the previous year”. 

It’s no surprise that Army was carefully monitoring morale in 1st Armoured Regiment after its tanks were stripped from it.  A backlash was expected.  This would’ve occurred if it hadn’t been for the way in which the unit was manipulated to convince its members that they had been granted an enormous privilege; the upshot being that a tank regiment was far less worthy of committed and dedicated members, than an experimentation unit. 

What are the ‘markers’ that Army uses to assess the morale of a unit (and under what circumstances are they put in place?).  Did 1 Armd Regt members know that their morale was being monitored?  Was the CO made aware?  Presumably, not.  Secrecy raises its head, yet again.  Whatever happened to ‘open and transparent’ governance?  Not to mention trust?

It would be a dire situation if the morale of 1 Armd Regt was to fall, given that all members are volunteers (should anyone want to remain with tanks they could have transferred to 2 Cav Regt … albeit in Townsville).  Imagine: a new unit; new challenges; an opportunity to lead the way; breaking new ground; and a new role that the CA himself deems to be operationally critical.  [Note: Some members of the unit would have had to face difficult family decisions associated with having to change schools at short notice.]

It is the bigger agenda that is of most concern, however.  As a consequence of making 1 Armd Regt an experimentation unit, 2 Cavalry Regiment in Townsville has been forced to become a dual-role unit, operating tanks for close fire support, and reconnaissance vehicles for intelligence gathering.  

It is patently obvious that these roles are incompatible for a single unit … command and control being impossible, for example, when operating from different parts of the combat zone.   [Note.  It is clear that this is a ‘peacetime only’ arrangement, with separate units having to be established for any operational deployment.]

In a ‘nutshell’, the RAAC has been decimated (with the tacit agreement of its hierarchy): The Corps’ most senior unit (with a 75- year heritage) has been made a non-combatant (something of clearly no consequence to the Chief of Army) and the Nation’s only armoured brigade has been left short by one battlegroup headquarters, a tank squadron and a cavalry squadron.   

All this at a time when the nation is confronting the worst strategic circumstances since the Second World War … not to mention, a greatly reduced warning time!  

How can this be?  Surely … Army readiness and preparedness comes before fielding an experimentation unit? 

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)

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