How did the RAAC end up in this position?
Delving into the realm of possibilities …
Tanks are stripped from 1st Armoured Regiment and it’s made a non-combatant; 2nd Cavalry Regiment becomes a dual-role unit with incompatible close fire support and reconnaissance roles; and 3 Brigade is forced to operate short by a tank squadron, a cavalry squadron and a battle-group headquarters.
It’s hard to imagine worse disasters affecting the combat power of the Armoured Corps. The only saving grace, is that the RAAC ARES is unaffected (as far as we know).
Apparently, negotiations took place between interested parties (i.e. those keen to avoid ‘their’ unit being the one to be scrapped). One has to presume that these were led by the three Honorary Colonels representing the three units involved: i.e. 1 Armd Regt; 2 Cav Regt; and 2/14 LHR (QMI).
Of course, rather than a debate among themselves, it’s possible that a ‘best outcome for the RAAC’ consensus position, could’ve been developed. [Available info, however, suggests that this was unlikely.]
The background is that when the infantry became responsible for armoured mobility (using mechanised infantry fighting vehicles in place of the APCs which the RAAC had previously operated), the RAAC supposedly lost manpower authority for a complete unit. [Was this true, or was it a smokescreen to hide what was going on in terms of scrapping 1 Armd Regt?]
Theoretically, all three units were in the ‘firing line’ and each could’ve been the one to be removed from the RAAC ORBAT. Whichever unit was designated, would be re-rolled as an experimentation unit. [This is now known NOT to have been the case.]
Interestingly, manpower permission for the new unit had already been granted. Which raises the question as to whether or not all three units were really being treated equally? Is it possible that 1 Armd Regt was actually the scapegoat all along? This seems very likely, given the advantages offered by Adelaide, in terms of 1 Armd Regt’s location.
Nothing has, as yet, been revealed about the lobbying that took place. To what extent, for example, did the Hon Col of 2 Cav Regt, argue the case for 2 Cav Regt to become a dual-role unit? Was this a telling factor … allowing 2/14 LHR (QMI) to remain unaffected, or were other factors at play?
As is now well known … the RAAC’s most senior unit, 1 Armd Regt, was the one that had to go! It’s also a fact that this was the only option considered.
Requests made to the Chief of Army, by the then RAAC Head of Corps and the then Representative Honorary Colonel, to reconsider … were dismissed.
Amazingly, the possibility of the RAAC becoming a corps comprising three ARA units, seems not to have been considered … so powerful was the mindset that there was no alternative, other than that an RAAC ARA unit had to be lost.
Without doubt, the best outcome for the RAAC would be: 1 Armd Regt and 2 Cav Regt both in Townsville, making up 3 (Armoured) Brigade with 3RAR in MICVs; while 2/14 LHR (QMI) remains in Brisbane. There is no compelling reason for geographical dispersion not being offset in this way.
The fundamental issue, of course, is leadership. To what extent is it possible for the RAAC’s leaders to work together to overturn the outrageous dismissal of 1 Armd Regt from the RAAC ORBAT? Do our leaders understand the importance of the task confronting them? Are they committed to it, or is it something that they might equivocate on?
But how is it possible to advance such a plan, when the former Chief of Army has given a clear direction that 1 Armd Regt is to be an experimentation unit?
Advocacy!
By stressing the critical importance of separate tank and recon regiments; by stressing the loss of combat power suffered by 3 Brigade’s dual-role unit; by stressing the significance of 1 Armd Regt’s 75-year lost heritage.
Surely … the loss of the RAAC’s combat power can’t be allowed to go unchallenged. The weakness imposed on the way that 2 Cav Regt is presently configured, is plain for all to see!
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)
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