“Look at what we have allowed the Army to become!”

This was a cry from the heart by the Deputy Chief of Army, Major General Chris Smith, DSC, AM, CSC, during the keynote address at the 2025 Chief of Army History Conference.  He was referring to a situation in Afghanistanin 2012 in which poor field discipline had become rife.  

Critical of the failure of command over many years and the loss of integrity involved; in his view, the Army has grown horribly complacent.  His address carried a clear message: ‘History is not just a study of the past, but also an explanation of the present” 

Chief of Army History Conference 2025 – Keynote Presentation

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is very clear: “Australia needs to spend more on defence—and it needs to do so immediately”.  In ASPI’s view, we are in the midst of the most dangerous period since the end of World War II.

The Institute points out that: “The strategic imperative has been firmly established in the government’s own major defence documents. The Albanese government and the Coalition opposition agree that we are in the gravest geopolitical period in generations, and this is only going to intensify … 

Disappointingly, in this context: “This year’s budget priorities [for 2024-25] were NOTdirected towards strengthening the Australian Defence Force’s ability to fight in the next decade”; and “Rhetorical urgency is NOT being matched by action in the form of defence investment.”  

The question for the RAAC is … has the complacency extended to a lack of conviction in terms of the need for close fire support for infantry?

How is it possible for a tank squadron to be removed from the ORBAT when the Army is in the middle of the most challenging strategic circumstances in our generation?

How indeed … is it possible for 3 (Armoured) Brigade to be without a battle-group headquarters and for 2nd Cavalry Regiment forced to operate as a dual-role unit with two squadrons of reconnaissance vehicles and two squadrons of tanks (when these roles are totally incompatible for a single unit).

Which is worse … an Army which grows complacent and ignores the fundamentals of close fire support; or an Army which determines the fundamentals of close fire support, not on the likely number of lives lost, but on the amount of the financial savings achievable?

The situation with 2 Cav Regt means that 3 Brigade is short a tank squadron, a cavalry squadron and a battle-group headquarters.  This is a considerable saving in terms of operating costs (at a time when AUKUS submarines vacuum up every ‘penny’ they can). 

[There will still be some veterans who will recall the times of track mileage limitations when these were imposed on all RAAC units in order to achieve cost savings.]

There is a lot to be said in support of the Deputy Chief of Army’s keynote address.  He had the fortitude to highlight how wrong the Army was in allowing the lapse in discipline to get to the extent that it did.  One has to wonder if others will make known failings that they become aware of, in the same way?  Doubtful, it would seem.

Stripping the tanks from 1 Armd Regt was done in such a secret manner (simply to give the Chief of Army the experimentation unit he wanted), that one has to wonder about the ethicality of it all.  

In February 2026, the Chief of Army praised “Army’s combined-arms land system”.  This, he said: “makes us more lethal and survivable, strengthening our ability to hold adversaries at risk and to secure strategic terrain”.  

The RAAC used to have a major role in terms of the Army’s combined-arms capability.  That is, until the tanks were stripped from 1st Armoured Regiment and 2 Cav Regt was forced to become a dual-role unit (with both roles being totally incompatible).  

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)

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FILE PHOTO (3 September 2016): Australian Army soldiers from 2nd Cavalry Regiment demonstrate the power of their M1A1 Abrams as part of 3rd Brigade’s Lavarack Barracks open day activities in north Queensland. Photo by Sapper Josh Saurin.

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