The future of tanks: Have they been made redundant by drones?

“Ukraine and Russia deploy drones for every tactical purpose imaginable: intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, artillery spotting, electronic warfare targeting, psychological operations, logistics and direct attack.” 

BUT, they can’t capture and hold ground, defend territory, nor defeat the enemy using shock action.  Only tanks have the mobility, protection, and endurance to do this.  The direct firepower they bring to bear is also the most accurate and destructive on the battlefield.   

As a result, tanks can dominate a battle for extended periods and the breakthroughs they achieve, when used ‘en masse’, can be decisive.  No armoured vehicle can close with and defeat another AFV, as decisively as a tank can.

Tanks evolved with the intent of being used either in combat against other tanks, or to provide close fire support for infantry.  Their demise has been heralded before … the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), for example, was at one time thought to be their end.

Today, the omni-presence of drones in the sky above has created a different battlespace; one which intensifies the threat matrix for tanks.  The major factor relevant to drones, is their cost. Just $30,000 each, or there-abouts.  Just as ATGMs were once thought to be the end for tanks, however, so too have anti-drone systems now been developed.  

Is it too late?  Could it be that ‘drones have done to tanks what muskets did to knights in armour’? Should tactics be changed, or would this be premature? 

There is no doubt that tactics must change.  It’s the nature of that change which must be worked through carefully.  The units that can adapt the quickest will have a significant advantage.  

Integrating layered active counter-drone defences such as shooting them down and jamming their navigation systems … with passive defence measures such as camouflage, will be the key.  Priority, of course, must also be given to counter-drone training. 

‘Conventional’ readiness measures for the force as a whole, must be maintained.   It would be a mistake, for example, for Australia to invest in drones … at the expense of tanks.  (Though this seems to be the intent of the Chief of Army … ‘he’ who is to retire in July.) 

The concentrated media coverage of tanks being destroyed by first-person view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions in the Ukraine-Russia War, gives a false impression.   While both sides have suffered huge losses of AFVs, little has been achieved in terms of territorial gains. 

It’s been said that drones have ended manoeuvre warfare and the battlefield has become static.  This is wrong.  Adaptations in manoeuvre warfare methods have certainly become necessary, however. 

By definition, manoeuvre warfare requires the ability to concentrate a force to achieve a decisive outcome.  Drone-enabled intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) have made this almost impossible to achieve covertly.  What can be done in these circumstances? 

Tactical responses have evolved, such as tanks operating in conjunction with vehicles equipped with anti-drone cannons.  Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles continue to play vital roles, particularly in attack.  

Armoured warfare has adapted, not disappeared: “Ukrainian counteroffensives and Russian defensive operations alike have shown that, while armoured breakthroughs are harder to achieve, they remain operationally necessary for exploiting tactical success.”

How relevant is the Russia-Ukraine War to Australia’s circumstances? 

While it obviously can’t be ignored, it should not determine future strategy.

No matter how much technology is available, boots on the ground will always be needed.  As always, and without any doubt whatsoever, the best force multiplier for infantry is armour. 

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)

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FILE PHOTO: An M1A1 Abrams main battle tank fires in support of infantry on Exercise Diamond Run 2017. Photo by Captain Anna-Lise Brink.

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