Trust: Is this Army’s weakness?

Trust … the result of a working environment in which human values are paramount: the dignity of the individual is respected; undertakings are honoured; those in need are helped; and decisions are taken which result in just outcomes.

There is no field in which trust is more important, than that of the profession of arms.  Unfortunately, it seems to have been misplaced as far as 1 Armd Regt is concerned. 

It’s been a topic before and will undoubtedly be one again.  Do you trust the man or woman beside you; do you trust the officer leading you?  If you can’t, the Army has lost its way!

Could trust have been harmed by the way in which the findings of the 2024 RAAC Corps Conference, involving Commanding Officers and Honorary Colonels from all RAAC units, were dismissed ‘out of hand’ by the Chief of Army?  

The recommendations were: 

“The creation of an Experimental Unit in Army is sensible and useful, but it has no relationship with 1 Armd Regt. That is, the two are separate ideas and calling the Experimental Unit 1 Armd Regt is both unnecessary and actually confusing.

The best operational outcome for Army is to form two battlegroups in Townsville, one commanding the cavalry and one commanding the tanks. This has benefits for training and operational focus. 

The best way to achieve this outcome is to raise RHQ 1 Armd Regt in Townsville and to assign the tanks to it”.

Could trust have been lost by the fact that there was no consultation with 1 Armd Regt stakeholders (i.e. those having a long-term involvement with the unit as a result of previous service and ongoing support activities) before tanks were stripped and the unit was made a non-combatant (not even having an RAAC role)?  

Could there have been a loss of trust suffered by the Chief of Army when the manner in which he disbanded 1 Armd Regt was bound up in such secrecy?

There is a back story here … there was concern about a ‘backlash’, i.e. residual esprit de corps associated with 1 Armd Regt, creating a problem for the transfer of loyalty to the experimentation unit.  Defence realised that they had to manage the situation very ‘sensitively’.  

The importance of the new experimentation unit had to be emphasised.  This was ultimately achieved and the transfer from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ took place without controversy being aroused. 

Given that this was something that the Chief of Army himself was focussed on achieving, his time and encouragement were readily available and helped considerably.  

It seems that at no time was any thought given to what affect the loss of a tank regiment, together with its associated years of training, might have on Army’s available combat power.  

3 Brigade was designated as an armoured brigade in the Defence Strategic Review.  The removal of 1 Armd Regt from the ORBAT has meant that the Brigade’s only other armoured unit has been forced to accept dual roles: BOTH intelligence gathering AND close fire support to infantry.  Roles which are totally incompatible for a single unit to provide!

Without any doubt the RAAC has been decimated.  From three regiments, to two; one of them with incompatible dual roles.  

How could we have reached this point?  

Presumably, the reconnaissance and fire support capabilities that the RAAC once brought to the forefront of battle … are no longer valued to the same degree.

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)

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