Can the Australian public trust in our national defence?

What is it that will convince Australian citizens that the government has produced a well-thought-out plan to defend our Nation?  Obviously, bi-partisan approval would help. 

One would have thought that it would be the support and backing given by the ADF hierarchy, that would be the major factor governing public confidence.  

Among other things, a major accounting firm has asked if the government’s 2026 National Defence Strategy will build trust with the public?  Could this be the critical issue which determines whether or not a new strategy succeeds or fails?  

The firm believes that if the new strategy doesn’t “confront budget realities, speed up reform, and build trust with industry and the public: Australia risks another strategy that’s an internal exercise – pored over by officials, but leaving industry uncertain and the public unconvinced”. 

Of course, the real outcome will only be known should the country be confronted by war – thereby providing the ultimate test of what works and what doesn’t.  

The Chief of the Defence Force recently stated that: “National security is something that touches all Australians, whether they are conscious of it or not, and that reality makes public understanding, preparedness and resilience more important than ever before”.  

To the shock of many Brits, the Royal Navy’s First Sea Lord, General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, recently said that the Royal Navy “is not yet fully prepared for war”.   Where does Australia stand in this respect?  Who knows?

To what degree is national security an abstract concept?  Is there any justification to think of it in this way?  A National Security Strategy might be a document produced in hard copy, but are the ideas it contains real and tangible, or more nebulous?

The Lowy Institute stated recently that the “The strategic environment has changed more in the last two years than it has in the past twenty”.  It also makes the point that “The Albanese Government has shown little inclination to increase defence spending commensurate with growing defence uncertainty”.

The Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Stuart, has stated that Defence is accelerating the acquisition of medium and heavy landing craft, upgraded amphibious vessels and modern facilities to support a new Littoral Manoeuvre Group. 

“The group will operate these platforms with a new specialised workforce, giving Army the ability to rapidly deploy and sustain its modernised land force – from Abrams tanks and precision strike weapons to infantry fighting vehicles – across demanding terrain”, he said.

Tanks, combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRVs), and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs): these are the central components of mobile warfare.  All are essential to combined-arms operations.  The number of tanks and CRVs, however, have been decimated under the Chief of Army’s orders.  

A squadron of tanks and another of CRVs have been removed from the Order of Battle.  Not only that, instead of separate RAAC units being responsible for intelligence gathering and the provision of close fire support for infantry, the two roles have been combined under a single unit.  As will be readily appreciated, the roles are totally incompatible on such a basis.   

According to the spin generated by the CA, however, the Army’s been given “the ability to rapidly deploy and sustain its modernised land force”.  

If you believe this, there are definitely ‘fairies in the bottom of your garden’. 

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron, MC, RAAC (Ret’d)

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FILE IMAGE: Austal Defence Shipbuilding Australia concept image depicting landing craft medium and heavy vessels conducting a beach landing.

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