Can the CDF or a Service Chief Do Anything He or She Wishes?

Can the CDF or a Service Chief Do Anything He or She Wishes?

There have been no female Chiefs as yet, but according to all accounts, the first is not far off. Do they have carte blanche as far as their orders are concerned, or are they constrained in some way … maybe by something even as benign as community expectations and standards?
This review will be conducted in relation to the Chief of Army’s powers, but it could apply equally to Navy and Air Force Chiefs. Any orders they give have to be ethical, of course. The ADF’s ‘Military Ethics’ doctrine states: “We must all understand our ethical and legal obligations to know when orders are ethical and lawful and when they are not.” What of other constraints, though? The Defence Act (1903) states that “the Chief of the Defence Force must utilise the Defence Force in such manner as is reasonable and necessary, for the purpose specified”. So, what would happen if the actions of the CDF/CA were unethical and/or unreasonable?
The Defence Strategic Review (DSR) was released in April 2023; the Government’s response provided six months later. As part of the latter, it was announced that the “1st Armoured Regiment will be re-roled as an experimental unit to deliver and integrate emerging technologies”. Three days beforehand, retired Maj Gen Fergus McLachlan, AO, a former CO 1 Armd Regt and Head of Army Modernisation/Forces Command, was reported as saying that “1 Armd Regt is going to be effectively disbanded”. So, it turned out to be. One imagines that Defence would have been working assiduously to ensure that implementation of the DSR went smoothly. Despite this, one criticism of it stood out: “its detrimental effect on the army’s armoured capability”.
Rather than crewing tanks to develop the skills to destroy the enemy and provide intimate fire support to infantry, as it has since 1949, 1 Armd Regt was reduced by two thirds and the remaining squadron made into a test bed for new technologies. Between them, the CDF and CA completely changed the raison d’être of the senior regiment in the Australian Army. This may have been ‘necessary’ in their minds, but was it reasonable?
The Army is made up of a number of different corps. These are administrative groupings of units that perform similar work functions, distinguished by different badges and lanyard colours. Strong esprit-de-corps is built up within them. After 75 years’ service to the nation crewing tanks, the Royal Australian Armoured Corps’ (RAAC’s) oldest and most decorated ARA unit, was removed, unilaterally, from combat duties on 28 September 2023.
The role of the RAAC is to locate, identify, capture and destroy the enemy, i.e. it is a combat arm of the Army. It would seem that 1 Armd Regt is no longer an RAAC unit, given its new status as a non-combatant test bed for new technologies. Not so … the CDF has directed, that it will remain part of the RAAC! Presumably the Head of Corps will change the Corps’ role to encompass 1 Armd Regt’s duties. This will be a first. Until now the Army has had two types of corps: arms and services (the latter, being non-combatants). Now we have a hybrid.

Two Things Were Behind the Decision Affecting 1 Armd Regt.
Firstly, the infantry assumed responsibility from the RAAC for Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and their replacements, Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicles (MICVs). This resulted in a reduction in the RAAC’s manpower ceiling, with a consequential increase in that of infantry. The RAAC’s three combat units could have been left to operate on slightly reduced manning in their Corps roles. However, (and secondly) the CA became convinced of the need to “fast-track the application of new and emerging technology and then exploit it across the rest of the army.” This is how the CA described what happened to 1 Armd Regt: “We just stood up, based on the first armoured regiment, a tech-scale battle group”. He was obviously proud, in his own mind, of this achievement.
Ethical, or Not?
One expects, from an ethical point of view, not to be misled by advice provided by the CDF (or his representative). The following are examples in which advice received was found to be incomplete and misleading.
The CDF stated that the Army was involved in “transformation of its doctrine and equipment” and 1 Armd Regt’s task was to “accelerate this transformation through experimentation and the development of new tactics”. Furthermore, “the Regiment and its soldiers have the adaptability and tactical creativity needed”. The CDF didn’t say what sort of transformation of doctrine and equipment was being undertaken; nor did he explain why soldiers in other units aren’t sufficiently adaptable, nor tactically creative.
Surprisingly, the CDF made no mention of the reduction in the RAAC’s manpower as a factor in his decision, stating only that 1 Armd Regt was “selected” for a number of reasons, including: “the Regiment’s reputation as some of the Army’s foremost experts in manoeuvre warfare”. It seems that there is a connection between being an expert in manoeuvre warfare and the transformation of doctrine and equipment. Help would be appreciated, if anyone knows what it is. Has the reduction in the RAAC’s manning been deliberately concealed?
The response to the author when asking if other units, apart from 1 Armd Regt, had been considered for the new role, was: “There were multiple course (sic) of actions considered under a broader capability review. To single out this one component of the review would be unhelpful as they are inter-related across a large number of units and future capability needs”. Maybe this means something to someone more versed in officialese. A simple yes or no would have sufficed.
The CDF stated that “The Regiment’s position on Army’s Order of Battle is unchanged”. This obviously can’t be true. ‘Order of Battle’ refers to deployment on the battlefield and level of combat effectiveness. A tank regiment which is stripped of its tanks to become a non-combatant, cannot maintain its place on the OOB (unless OOB is being used in a totally different and unusual context).
The CDF advised that the CA sought advice from the RAAC Head of Corps. This is as it should be. The trouble was, however, the CDF failed to mention what the advice was. The impression given is that the HOC supported the CA; whereas the author is informed that the HOC actually wrote to the CA “requesting that he reconsider his decision”. This is obviously unethical.
As part of his justification for 1 Armd Regt’s change of role, the CDF stated that “armoured regiments have been at the forefront of military innovation for more than a century”. This, of course, is a broad generalisation, as evidenced by the drastic stalling of tank development, following the First World War. Like that of all weapon systems, Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) development is linked with advances in technology, some revolutionary, but most not. Military innovation certainly hasn’t followed on the coat hooks of AFV design. Maybe the statement by the CDF wasn’t meant to be taken literally, but is it ethical to use generalisations in this way?
At the 2024 Corps Conference, involving COs and Honorary Colonels from all RAAC units, the position agreed in relation to 1 Armd Regt was:
1. “The creation of an Experimental Unit in Army is sensible and useful, but it has no relationship with 1 Armd Regt. That is, the two are separate ideas and calling the Experimental Unit 1 Armd Regt is both unnecessary and actually confusing.
2. The best operational outcome for Army is to form two battlegroups in Townsville, one commanding the cavalry and one commanding the tanks. This has benefits for training and operational focus. The experience of the ACRs shows us that amalgamation of armoured capabilities produces sub-optimal outcomes.
3. The best way to achieve this outcome is to raise RHQ 1 Armd Regt in Townsville and to assign the tanks to it”.
The CDF declined to mention this. On the one hand, it might be thought that this is understandable, as it describes a different position to that adopted by the CA and himself; on the other, should he not be expected to address all the pros and cons associated with an issue? Is it ethical to knowingly limit an explanation provided to the public, to that which shows the CDF’s own position in the best light?
Why was the decision kept secret? Many have commented that it was not publicised in any way; rather, it only became known (if you looked closely) on the day the Defence Strategic Review became public, that 1 Armd Regt had been made a non-combatant. Simply put … the RAAC, its stakeholders and veterans, were ambushed. A unit which had spent 75 years learning to survive and win on the battlefield, day after day … was suddenly told that its tanks had been removed and it would no longer be a fighting arm of the Army. Surely a 75-year heritage deserves better than this. An ethical process is an open and transparent one; not a secret one. Was there an expectation that any publicity about 1 Armd Regt might give rise to a backlash?
The CDF states that: “The Regiment will continue to carry the Standard presented to it by King Charles III in 1981”. A u cnit is entitled to carry a Standard if it is the modern equivalent of a heavy cavalry (dragoon guards) regiment, i.e. a tank regiment. It follows that a unit not equipped with tanks is not entitled to a Standard. This is a tradition of the British Army, that Australia has adopted. Is it ethical to simply change such a tradition to meet one’s own needs?

Reasonable, or Not?
The Chief of Army has said: “To be sure, putting Australian soldiers on the ground and in harm’s way, remains the ultimate expression of our nation’s will and resolve”. 1 Armd Regt used to be a proud benchmark in this respect. Now that responsibility has been passed, unilaterally, to others. What is the future for a 1 Armd Regt which is no longer in harm’s way and can no longer strive to be the ultimate expression of our nation’s will and resolve? Can it ever be the same, even though it may have important new responsibilities in other fields as a non-combatant? Of course, not. Its raison d’être is changed completely. It can well be argued that it is unreasonable for the CA to make a unilateral decision in this respect.
The CDF has stated that “morale in the Regiment is high (in fact, “improved in 2024 from the previous year”). Furthermore, the soldiers take pride in “the cutting-edge work” that they are involved in. What does this mean? It means that the new (one third size) unit is being led well and being given rewarding tasks. What it does NOT mean is that the heritage and traditions of 1 Armd Regt when it was equipped with tanks have continued in any way. This is as must be expected. New unit … new challenges … new traditions. Unfortunately, the heritage, esprit de corps, tank-craft and skills built up during the unit’s service to the nation between 1949 and 2024, are completely wasted. Is this reasonable? Of course not.
Unsurprisingly, there is an alternative to giving 1 Armd Regt a different role (an even better option, as it happens). At present 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Townsville commands four squadrons (usually a unit only commands three). These squadrons are comprised of two different types of armoured vehicles. Not only do they have different roles (infantry support and reconnaissance), but they are still in the process of being progressively introduced into service. A far better arrangement would be for the 1 Armd Regt HQ to be raised in Townsville to command the tanks, with 2 Cav Regt commanding the reconnaissance elements. This has the added advantage of enabling 1 Armd Regt and 2 Cav Regt to each form battlegroups; thereby significantly increasing the combat power and flexibility of 3 Brigade in Townsville. Even better, this is at a time when Talisman Sabre, the largest joint US-Australia training exercise, is to be conducted.
Conclusion
The powers of the CDF and service chiefs are not completely without constraint. Orders they give must be both ethical and reasonable. There is evidence to claim that the decision of the CDF and CA to make 1 Armd Regt a non-combat unit is neither ethical nor reasonable. The question was posed at the start as to what would happen if this was to eventuate?
It would seem that the answer is, as it is so often … it depends. How can the CDF and/or CA be compelled to change their minds? Obviously, it would be ideal if they could be convinced that a better solution was available. It might be, however, that they don’t want to be seen as being wrong and, as a result, become more entrenched in their position. There are many examples of what can be called, human nature, in this respect. Sometimes the weight of public pressure can achieve small miracles, but rarely can such lobbying be organised successfully.
So … maybe the constraints are there, it’s just that they’re theoretical.

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